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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
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JACKSON LAND AND {~~ ~-. · k ~ 8-J~-.t't- !~~- ,-_:·0~;:-~ -; ~--:~; ~.,- ·J . .. ... 
. LIVESTOCK COMPANY 
a corporation 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
. :_-THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
. OF UTAH, 
defendant. 
Plain tiff's 
Reply Brief 
No. 7904 
On a Writ of Certorari Directed to The State Tax 
Commission of Utah 
PRESTON & HARRIS, 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J~\.CI~SOX I~~-\ND .A.ND 
Lf\ .. ESTOCI( CO~fP-4-\.NY 
a corporation 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE ST~:\.TE TAX COMMISSION 
OF l-.-TAH, 
defendant. 
Plaintiff's 
Reply Brief 
No. 7904 
Since counsel for the Commission based the argu-
ment against exemption on the similarity between the 
State Franchise Tax and the Federal Income Tax· on 
corporations, we feel that it will be helpful to make a 
comparison of the two laws. Lnder the laws of Utah 
all agricultural corporations are specifically exempt, 
whether for profit or not, and if this broad exemption 
had not been intended the legislature could easily have 
said :~o. 
Applying the same argument to the Federal In-
come Tax we find that the Congress actually made a dis-
tinction bet\veen taxable and non-taxable agricultural 
organizations. The Internal Revenue Code, 1951, pro-
vided for this distinction by 'vhat is known as· the irn-
, I ·' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
position of the "Supplement U Tax". (See Prentice-
I-Iall Fede~al 'rax Service, 1952, - 9-4-52, Vol. 1, page 
4291) Sec. 421, of I. R. C., as follows: "Supplement 
l r -Taxation of Business Income of Certain Section 
101 Organizations (Note: Section 101 corresponds to 
the Utah law on exempt corporations). (a) In General: 
'r'herP shall be levied, collected, and paid for each tax-
able year beginning after December 31, 1950 . . . (A) 
ORGANIZATIONS EXElVIPT UNDER SECTION 101 
(1) (Note: 101 (1) is the I. R. C. section exempting 
labor, argricultural and horticultural organizations). 
The taxes imposed by subsection (a) (1) shall apply 
in the case of any organization ... which is exempt, 
except as provided in this supplement, from taxation 
under this chapter by reason of paragraph (1), (6). 
or (7) of section 101. 
Supplement r-:- then sets forth the rates of taxation 
on various incomes and classifications of corporations. 
Of course, Supplement lT has been altered from time 
to time. The last one was aimed at the prevalent prac-
tice of "lease back agreen1ents," but carried the usual 
Supplement U taxation which has characterized the 
Federal Statutes for years. Thus, if one reads onl~· 
Section 101, he gains the in1pression that the Federal 
statutes and the State statutes are the sa1ne. Sueh 
is distinctly not the ease. Our statute grants a blanket 
exemption \vith no stated exceptions. The Federal 
·statute creates only an exen1pt classification, and re-
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ferene~ n1ust then be had to Supplement U to determine 
\Yhethr any corporation falls within the exemption. This 
becon1es ~o~ because of other provisions of the Internal 
ReYenue Code~ \Yhieh describe the character of the or-
ganizations \Yhich Inay be deemed as exempt. That is to 
say, a charitable organization may be exempt, but if it 
lu1s "-hat the Code calls "unrelated business net in-
conle ~ ·~ ~uch inco1ne is subject to the tax, even though 
the con1pany n1ay still be an exe1npt corporation. Thus, 
regulation 111. Sec. 29.101 (1)-1, Prentice-Hall, supra. 
page -122-± states: ''Similarly, corporations engaged· in 
growing agricultural or horticultural products for profit 
are not exempt from tax. For taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 1950, organizations othervvise ex-
einpt from tax under this section (101-(1)) are taxable 
upon their Supplement l~ net incon1e. See sections 421 
through 424, and the regulations thereunder.'' 
Thus, our State Tax Commission cannot follow the 
Federal practice because they do not have the same stat-
utory power to do so, and citations from Federal de-
ci~ions will not be based on the same reasoning, because 
of the terms of Supplen1ent U which provides a tax 
on all organizations which make a profit from their 
operations for the benefit of stockholders or members, 
and it is this profit which it c.alls "unrelated business 
net incoine". If our statute had a similar "supplement 
U" provision 've may be taxable. Lacking it, vve are 
not taxable, and the statute is so clear and unequivoc~ 
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able, that it needs no reference to any report of legis-
lative proceedings for clarification. 
The objection we see to the arguments in defend-
ant's brief is that it ignores acknowledged and long 
Pstablished rules of statutory construction. It is only 
in cases where language is ambiguous that we need 
to construe a statute. Our Statute says in simple lang-
uage that an "agricultural corporation is exempt". 
It would have been simple for the legislature to have 
said ''agricultural corporations not organized for profit, 
are exempt''. Why did the legislature use different 
la!lguage in sub-sec. (1) than in the others~ 
"Where language is used in one section differ-
ent from that employed in other sections of the 
same chapter and from that used in statutes 
which existed prior to its enactment, it is to be 
presu1ned that the language is used with a dif-
ferent intent." Wine v. Comrnonwealth, (Mass.) 
17 N. E. 2d 545, 120 A. L. R. 889. 
This Court has repeatedly refused to write judicial 
legislation into statutes vvhere the meaning is already 
clear: 
''Those who are qualified under the statute are 
entitled to the benefit of the exemption; while 
under the 1naxim that, \Vhen a statute enumerates 
the things upon 'vhich it is to operate, it is to 
be construed as excluding from its effect all tho8e 
not expressly Inentioned. Those \Vho cannot qual-
if}T under the st~tute are to be excluded from its 
operation. '' Zuniga ·v. Evans (Utah) 48 P. 2d 
513. 
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Neither is resort to be had to legislative debate~ 
and con11nission reports 'vhen the meaning of a statute 
is clear and needs no interpretation. The U. S. Supreme 
Court, Addison Y. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 US 
607, 153 . .:\ .. L. R. 1107 set this matter at rest involving 
an ad:rninistrative interpretation: 
'lo The natural meaning of words cannot be dis-
placed by reference to difficulties of administra-
tion. For the ultimate question is what has Con-
gress commanded, 1vhen it has given no clue to 
its intentions except familiar English words and 
no hint by the draftsmen of the words that they 
1neant to use the1n in any but an ordinary sense. 
The idea which is now sought to be read into the 
grant by Congress to the Administrator to de-
fine 'the area of production' beyond the plain 
geographic implications of that phrase is not so 
complicated nor is English speech so poor that 
\Vords were not easily available to expres~ \ 
the idea or at least to suggest it''. 
The language of the Supreme Court of Montana 
is apt: 
''To reach the result contended for by appellants, 
subdivision ( 4) would have to read: 'On debts 
(originally) secured hy mortgages, etc.' We have 
neither the power nor the right to read/the word 
'originally' or language of sin1ilar in1port into 
the statute. Our office is sin1ply to ascertain 
and declare what is in terms or in substance 
contained herein, not to insert what has been 
omitted, or to omit what has been inserted". 
(Siuru v. Sell, 91 P. 2d 411, 123 A. L. R. 432). 
Since writing the original brief we have discovered 
a Washington case which treats with the same matter-
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a tax on the doing of business. The question there 
'vas whether or not the Supreme Court would restrict 
the exemption : 
"It has been said that, inasmuch as we are 
dealing with an exemption from taxation, the 
rule of strict construction applies, and this will 
be admitted. That rule, however, does not call 
for giving to words used in creating the exemp-
tion anything but their ordinary meaning. As 
we view it, the legislative intent is not stated 
in ambiguous language, nor is it doubtful''. (Yak-
ima Fruit, etc. v. Henneford, 47 P. 2d 831, 100 
A. L. R. 435). 
That is the reason why the cases cited by opposing 
Counsel are not in point, as for example the much 
cited Norvill v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 
97 P. 2d 937. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRESTON & HARRIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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